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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Recreational cannabis was legalized in Canada over a year ago. 
Canada became only the second country, after Uruguay, and eleven 
 
* Professor of Law and University Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall Law 
School. The excellent research assistance provided by Keneca Pingue-Giles (Osgoode JD, 
2021) and Mandy Bedford (University of Ottawa JD, 2020) is gratefully acknowledged. 
The funding provided by the Canadian Foundation for Legal Research is also noted with 
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Comparative Insolvency Symposium at the University of Miami Law School as well as the 
editors of the Miami International & Comparative Law Review. This paper benefitted in 
particular by the thoughtful comments provided by Professor Freya Kodar. 
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American states, to legalize recreational cannabis.1 However, the black 
market continues to supply 83.9–88% of the market since it is significantly 
cheaper than legal cannabis.2 Marijuana represents nearly half of the $300 
billion dollar global illegal narcotics market and is the drug of choice for 
most of the world’s 250 million illicit drug–users.3 Much has been written 
on the role that justice debt plays in the cycle of poverty.4 To that end, 
legalizing cannabis not only deprives organized crime of its single biggest 
source of income but also protects consumers from the debts associated 
with its criminalization. Canadian policymakers also had to consider other 
aspects of legalization, including how it fits into existing commercial law, 
the appropriate level of tax, and restrictions on its sale. 
 
However, it remains unclear how the new industry will fare with the 
inevitable commercial bankruptcies. As with all other sectors in the 
economy, the cannabis industry relies on certainty to deal with financial 
failure. Getting this policy wrong can discourage entrepreneurial activity 
and new business growth. Thus, the improvement of a country’s 
bankruptcy system is crucial to realize the benefits of legal recreational 
cannabis. This article asks a question that has received less consideration– 
how should countries’ legal systems deal with inevitable financial failure 
in this newly legal industry? With legalization comes new opportunities 
for investment and innovation, from growers, to brick and mortar stores, 
to “weed tech” and breakthrough science. A well-developed method for 
dealing with financial failure in this industry is crucial to avoid the fear of 




1 Jeremy Berke & Skye Gould, Legal Marijuana Just Went on Sale in Illinois. Here Are 
All the States Where Cannabis is Legal, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 1, 2020), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/legal-marijuana-states-2018-1. 
2 Statistics Canada, CANNABIS ECONONMIC ACCOUNT, THIRD QUARTER 2018 (Nov. 21, 
2018), http://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/daily-quotidien/181121/dq181121d-
eng.pdf?st=DF5bSH5a; Marcy Nicholson, RBC Pegs Legal Pot Sales at 12% of Market as 
Illicit Prices Seen Dropping, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Oct. 9, 2019), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/robcannabispro/article-rbc-pegs-legal-pot-sales-at-12-
of-market-as-illicit-prices-seen/. 
3 The Right Way to do Drugs, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 13, 2016), 
http://www.economist.com/leaders/2016/02/13/the-right-way-to-do-drugs. 
4 See e.g., Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Arash Nayerahmadi, Over-Indebted Criminals in Canada 
42 MAN. L. J. 207 (2019); Pat O’Malley, THE CURRENCY OF JUSTICE: FINES AND DAMAGES 
IN CONSUMER SOCIETIES, (Routledge-Cavendish, 2009); Abbye Atkinson, Consumer 
Bankruptcy, Nondischargeability, and Penal Debt, 70 VAND. L. REV. 917 (2017). 
228 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV.  Vol. 27:2 
 
This article offers an evaluation of Canada’s approach to addressing 
financial failure in this industry. It also seeks to provide insights for 
Canada’s law reform process, as well as for countries including Mexico, 
South Africa, and New Zealand as they continue to evaluate reforms to the 
treatment of cannabis. Part I reviews the businesses risks involved in 
entering the legal cannabis market. Part II considers the acceptance of the 
cannabis industry by capital markets. Part III reviews the insolvency 
processes and challenges that exist for cannabis companies, including in 
the United States for comparison. Part IV provides a narrative on the best 
practices for cannabis legalization and areas for reform. Part V suggests 
that while Canada’s insolvency system could benefit from reform, a 
significant external benefit of legalization of recreational cannabis may be 
the potential for American companies to use the Canadian bankruptcy 
system while it remains illegal federally in the United States. Part VI 
concludes. 
II. BUSINESS RISKS IN ENTERING THE LEGAL CANNABIS 
MARKET: 
 
Governments are able to generate substantial revenue from taxing the 
legal sale of cannabis. As a result, it is in their best interests to have as 
many licensed cannabis producers, sellers, cultivators, processors, and 
retailers as is practical in order to eliminate the black market. That being 
said, the potential for oversaturation in the cannabis market is a serious 
concern for current and future business owners. If supply outstrips 
demand, cannabis businesses may not be able to generate enough revenue 




In Canada, the cannabis market has not yet become oversaturated. For 
example, Ontario capped the retail marijuana licenses that would be issued 
at 25, despite receiving 17,320 expressions of interest.5 An additional 50 
retail licenses will be issued after October 2019, eight of which will be for 
 
5 Cannabis Act Regulations, O. Reg. 468/18, § 8.1(2) (Can.); The Canadian Press, Race on 
to Partner with Ontario’s Cannabis Retail License Winners, CBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2019), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/cannabis-licence-retail-1.4977773. 
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dispensaries on reserves.6 In contrast, British Columbia is not limiting the 
number of retail cannabis licenses that can be issued.7 As of November 5, 
2019, there were 160 licensed cannabis retailers in that province.8 
Saskatchewan is taking a phased approach, where 51 cannabis retail 
licenses were available in the first round of license allocations.9 Depending 
on the demand for more retail licenses, the province may allocate 
additional licenses in a second round of applications.10  
 
Health Canada, which has the authority to issue seller, cultivator, and 
processor licenses, does not currently limit number of licenses that can be 
issued.11 That being said, it is possible that the Canadian cannabis market 
could become oversaturated due to the lack of a license cap from the 
Western provinces. If oversupply occurs, the price of cannabis will drop, 
potentially leading to solvency issues for producers and dispensers.  
 
The problem of oversaturation could be exacerbated by a lack of brand 
loyalty in the cannabis industry. Unlike alcohol or tobacco, which had 
multiple established brands before advertising was restricted, cannabis 
brands are establishing themselves in a constrained environment. For 
instance, companies are not allowed to present their products in a way that 
associates its brand with “glamour, recreation, excitement, vitality, risk or 
daring.”12 Provincial governments can place further restrictions on “brand-
 
6 News Release, Ministry of the Attorney Gen., Gov’t of Ont., Ontario Moving Forward 
with Next Round of Cannabis Stores (July 3, 2019), 
http://news.ontario.ca/mag/en/2019/07/ontario-moving-forward-with-next-round-of-
cannabis-stores.html. 
7Retailers, B.C. LIQUOR DISTRIBUTION BRANCH, 
http://www.bcldbcannabisupdates.com/opportunities/retailers (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) 
(scroll down to FAQ and click on “Q. Will there be a cap on the number of cannabis retail 
licenses in BC?”). 
8 Application Statistics, PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Jan. 27, 2020), 
http://justice.gov.bc.ca/cannabislicensing/policy-document/application-stats. 
9 Press Release, Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority, CANNABIS RETAILERS 
SELECTED (June 1, 2018), http://www.saskatchewan.ca/government/news-and-
media/2018/june/01/cannabis-retailers-selected. 
10 Frequently Asked Questions, SASKATCHEWAN LIQUOR AND GAMING AUTHORITY, 
http://www.slga.com/faqs#group-4-15 (last visited July 16, 2019) (scroll down to “4.15 
Cannabis Legalization”). 
11 Cannabis Licensing Application Guide: Cultivation, Processing and Sale for Medical 
Purposes, HEALTH CANADA, 4 (2018), https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/hc-
sc/documents/services/drugs-medication/cannabis/industry-licensees-
applicants/licensing-summary/guide/clag-eng.pdf. 
12 Cannabis Act, S.C. 2016, c. 16, § 17(1)(e) (Can.).  
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preference” promotions, including branded apparel.13 Other strategies that 
may encourage customer loyalty, including points programs, may violate 
federal rules, although the scope of that prohibition remains unclear.14 
Finally, the lack of adequate legal supply in some markets is diminishing 
brand loyalty.15 A customer who might prefer the product from one 
company may purchase cannabis from another if that is all that is available 
at their local dispensary. These factors contribute to a challenging 
environment for new players seeking to differentiate their product in the 
marketplace.  
b. Regulatory Requirements & License Suspensions 
 
As a new industry, the regulatory risk for the cannabis industry is high. 
Federal and provincial regulators across the country have made numerous 
changes to cannabis regulations in the short time that it has been legal.16 
As a result, if cannabis businesses operators are not up to date with the 
latest regulations, they risk having their license revoked or suspended, 
which would prohibit the business from operating and earning revenues.17  
 
These regulatory changes can have major financial consequences for 
new or potential license-holders. For example, Health Canada recently 
announced that new applicants must have a fully-built site compliant with 
the Cannabis Regulations at the time of their application.18 Before it was 
 
13 Susan Krashinsky Robertson, Buying Blind: Cannabis Marketing Restrictions Leave 
Little Brand Awareness in the New Recreational Market, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Apr. 7, 
2019), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-buying-blind-cannabis-
marketing-restrictions-leave-little-brand/. 
14 Solomon Israel, City Weed Stores’ Loyalty-Points Program May Not be Legal, Lawyers 
Say, THE LEAF (Apr. 11, 2019), http://www.theleafnews.com/news/city-weed-stores-
loyalty-points-program-may-not-be-legal-lawyers-say-508455382.html. 
15 Kristine Owram, Canada’s Pot Market is Still Struggling to Meet Demand and it’s About 
to Get Much Worse, FINANCIAL POST (June 5, 2019), 
http://business.financialpost.com/cannabis/canadas-shambolic-pot-market-will-soon-get-
much-worse. 
16 Jason Herring, Retailers Left in a Haze as New Cannabis Promotion Rules Announced, 
EDMONTON JOURNAL (Sept. 13, 2019), https://edmontonjournal.com/news/local-
news/new-cannabis-promotion-rules-limit-sign-size/.  
17 Victor Ferreira, CannTrust Slides Further After Health Canada Suspends Cannabis 
Licenses, FINANCIAL POST (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://business.financialpost.com/cannabis/cannabis-business/canntrusts-licence-to-
produce-and-sell-cannabis-suspended-by-health-canada.  
18 Press Release, Health Canada, Statement from Health Canada on Changes to Cannabis 
Licensing (May 8, 2019), http://www.canada.ca/en/health-
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a requirement to be granted a license, 70% of applicants who passed the 
initial paper-based application did not provide evidence about their 
facility.19 Health Canada was concerned that it was expending scarce 
resources reviewing paper applications for applicants who may not be in a 
position to begin operations if they received a license.20 Although 
requiring applicants to have a fully built site before they apply may speed 
up the licensing process, these new rules will negatively affect cannabis 
entrepreneurs’ ability to access capital, likely depressing the number of 
license applicants.  
 
Before the licensing changes, applicants who were in the queue to 
have their applications reviewed would receive a pre-approval letter from 
Health Canada.21 This pre-approval helped reassure investors that a license 
would be forthcoming and made it easier for entrepreneurs to secure 
capital. Often these funds were used to build a production facility that 
would be compliant with the applicable regulations. Therefore, with the 
new requirements, it is more likely that new cannabis players will be shut 
out of the market or have short stints in the cannabis industry. As a result, 
the established cannabis players have an additional advantage to new 
market entrants, making it more likely that the new players will be forced 
into insolvency or be acquired by larger businesses.  
 
With the legalization of recreational cannabis, the cultivation, 
processing, and distribution of the substance has become highly regulated 
in an attempt to prevent the sale of cannabis on the black market, and to 
ensure that consumers are receiving safe, high quality product. If Health 
Canada becomes aware that a licensed cannabis company is selling 
cannabis from an unauthorized source, they can suspend or revoke its 
license. If this happens, that company will not be able to continue 
operations, to their financial detriment. Bonify Medical Cannabis 






21 Vanmala Subramaniam, To Apply for a License to Grow Cannabis in Canada, You Now 
Have to Have a Fully Built Site Ready to Go, FINANCIAL POST (May 8, 2019), 
http://business.financialpost.com/cannabis/to-apply-for-a-licence-to-grow-cannabis-you-
now-need-to-have-a-fully-built-site-ready-to-go. 
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how this process can unfold.22 Health Canada suspended Bonify’s license 
for not complying with the requisite production practices after an 
investigator claimed that senior managers brought 200kgs of unlicensed 
cannabis into the production facility.23 The provincial regulator also 
suspended the sale of Bonify products.24 Bonify’s CEO said that the 
company could function without sales for as long as a year while the 
license suspension was being appealed.25 It was reinstated after eight 
months.26 Had the suspension been longer, or Bonify less-capitalized, it is 
likely that the company’s fixed expenses would have made the company 
insolvent while the license was suspended.  
 
In some instances, a company may choose to suspend its sales in an 
effort to comply with a Health Canada investigation. CannTrust, one of 
Canada’s largest cannabis companies, suspended the sale of its product on 
July 8, 2019, after Health Canada became aware of five unlicensed rooms 
producing cannabis.27 Health Canada froze the use of 5,200 kilograms of 
cannabis that was produced in the unlicensed rooms and CannTrust 
voluntarily put a hold on an additional 7,500 kilograms of cannabis.28 In 
response, CannTrust’s stock price plummeted 37%.29 Once Health Canada 
completed its investigation into the company’s illegal business practices, 
it cancelled CannTrust’s license to sell and produce cannabis for growing 
 
22 Susan Montoya Bryan, Health Canada Suspends License of Winnipeg Cannabis 
Producer Bonify, CBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2019), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/bonify-recalled-cannabis-manitoba-1.5007446. 
23 Id.; see also Cannabis Regulations, SOR/2018-144, §§ 79–92 (Can.) (information on the 
good production practices). 
24 Id. 
25 Ian Froese, RCMP Not Investigating Winnipeg Cannabis Producer That Sold 
Unauthorized Weed, CBC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2019), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/bonify-cannabis-producer-no-charges-rcmp-
lawsuit-dismissal-1.5070578. 
26 David George-Cosh, Bonify’s Pot Sales License Reinstated by Health Canada After 8-
Month Suspension, BNN BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2019), 
http://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/bonify-s-pot-sales-licence-reinstated-by-health-canada-
after-8-month-suspension-1.1336398. 
27 Victor Ferreira, CannTrust Whistleblower Says Health Canada Would Never Have 
Found Unlicensed Rooms Without Him, FINANCIAL POST (July 12, 2019), 
http://business.financialpost.com/investing/canntrust-whistleblower-believes-health-
canada-would-never-have-found-unlicensed-rooms-without-him. 
28 Peter Evans, CannTrust’s Cannabis Sale Put on Hold by Health Canada for Unlicensed 
Growing, CBC NEWS (Jul. 8, 2018), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/canntrust-health-
canada-1.5203578. 
29 Ferreira, supra note 27. 
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illegal cannabis.30 In order to regain regulatory compliance, CannTrust 
agreed to destroy $12 million worth of plants, and $65 million worth of 
inventory.31 In late October 2019, the company announced that it had laid 
off a quarter of its workforce in a bid to reduce its expenses until its license 
can be reinstated.32 If the license is not reinstated within 35 weeks of the 
temporary layoffs, CannTrust will be responsible for $800,000 in 
severance payments.33 It remains to be seen if the company will be able to 
recover from its loss of investor, shareholder, and regulatory confidence, 
or will require insolvency proceedings.  
 
In summary, if Health Canada suspended or revoked a licence, or 
opened an investigation, it could affect a cannabis company’s ability to 
generate cash flow. This would make it difficult, particularly for new or 
small businesses, to cover its fixed expenses, such as rent, wages, and any 
monthly interest payments. Cannabis companies must be diligent in 
following the mandated regulations for cannabis production and 
distribution in order to remain operational licensed cannabis companies. 
The frequent changes to these regulations present a business risk for their 
operations. 
c. Litigation Risk 
 
A third business risk associated with cannabis regulations is the 
potential for product recalls and individual or class action lawsuits if 
cannabis produced and sold does not meet Health Canada standards. For 
example, OrganiGram, New Brunswick’s largest licensed supplier of 
medical marijuana, was accused of selling pesticide contaminated 
products in 2016, which resulted in product recalls in 2016 and 2017.34 In 
response, a class action suit was certified on January 18, 2019, by the Nova 
Scotia Supreme Court.35 The plaintiffs in the class action are seeking 
 
30 CannTrust to Destroy C$77 Million Worth of Plants, Inventory to Regain Compliance, 
REUTERS (Oct. 14, 2019), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-cannabis-
canntrust/canntrust-to-destroy-c77-million-worth-of-plants-inventory-to-regain-
compliance-idUSKBN1WT25X. 
31 Id.  
32 The Canadian Press, CannTrust Laying Off up to 140 People as it Works to Regain 
Cannabis Licenses, CBC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2019), 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/canntrust-layoffs-cannabis-licenses-1.5335100. 
33 Id.  
34 Downton v. Organigram Holdings, Inc., [2019] N.S.R. 2d, paras. 29, 33, 38-39 (Can.). 
35 Id. at ¶ 368.  
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damages for experiencing adverse health effects because of the 
contamination.36 OrganiGram has insurance that will cover the cost of 
legal fees and may also cover any monetary damages associated with the 
suit.37 Unlike with CannTrust and Bonify, OrganiGram’s license has not 
been suspended, and it can still generate revenues. However, the 
consequences to its reputation may negatively affect its sales, which could 
lead to financial issues.  
 
There is also a risk that cannabis companies could be held responsible 
for health problems caused by their product, even if they met Health 
Canada regulations. Courts in both Canada and the United States are 
adjudicating lawsuits in which governments are seeking to recoup 
healthcare costs from tobacco companies and opioid manufacturers.38 In 
Canada, these claims are expected to run into the tens of billions of 
dollars.39  
 
Despite legalization, provincial governments warn consumers that 
cannabis can cause lung problems similar to smoking tobacco, mental 
health challenges, and low birthweight and learning difficulties for babies 
exposed to cannabis in utero.40 The Canadian Paediatric Society has 
counseled that teenagers and young adults should not use cannabis because 
 
36 Id. at ¶ 4.  
37 Class-Action Lawsuit Against OrganiGram Gets Green Light, CBC NEWS (Jan. 21, 
2019), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/class-action-lawsuit-medical-
cannabis-organigram-1.4986632. 
38 See, e.g., Brendan Pierson, Factbox: The U.S. Opioid Epidemic in the Courts, REUTERS 
(Sept. 16, 2019), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-opioids-litigation-
factbox/factbox-the-u-s-opioid-epidemic-in-the-courts-idUSKBN1W11U8; Richard 
Wolf, Supreme Court Won’t Block Smokers’ Lawsuits Against Big Tobacco Companies, 
U.S.A. TODAY (Feb. 25, 2019), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/02/25/supreme-court-wont-block-
lawsuits-against-major-tobacco-companies/2978663002/ (American examples); Sammy 
Hudes, Alberta to Join B.C. in Class Action Lawsuit Against Opioid Manufacturers, 
CALGARY HERALD (Oct. 15, 2019), http://calgaryherald.com/news/politics/alberta-to-join-
b-c-in-class-action-lawsuit-against-opioid-manufacturers; Thomas Mulier & Sandrine 
Rastello, Big Tobacco’s Legal Woes in Canada Pose its Biggest Risk in Decades, 
FINANCIAL POST (Mar. 20, 2019), http://business.financialpost.com/news/retail-
marketing/big-tobaccos-legal-woes-in-canada-pose-biggest-risk-in-decades (Canadian 
examples). 
39 Hudes, supra note 38; Mulier & Rastello, supra note 38.  
40 Cannabis and Your Health, HEALTHLINKBC (Oct. 10, 2018), 
http://www.healthlinkbc.ca/health-topics/cannabis-your-health. 
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it has the potential to irreversibly change brain development.41 
Manufacturers of cannabis-related paraphernalia are also potentially at 
risk of litigation for health problems, as illustrated by growing concerns 
and cases against vaping companies.42 
 
Publicly traded firms can also face legal action related to securities 
violations. Once the public became aware of CannTrust’s potentially 
unlicensed production, a complaint was filed with the Ontario Securities 
Commission (OSC).43 The complaint questioned if CannTrust was 
engaged in fraud and intentionally putting investors at risk by not 
disclosing the fact that they were wilfully contravening regulations.44 The 
OSC opened a quasi-criminal investigation to investigate the allegation of 
fraud, which carries a penalty of up to five years in jail and fines of up to 
$5 million per conviction.45 Outside of the OSC investigation, 14 law 
firms, 13 from the U.S. and one from Canada, have initiated class action 
lawsuits against CannTrust.46 The Canadian law firm, Strosberg Sasso 
Sutts LLP, located in Windsor, Ontario, is seeking $250 million in 
damages for negligent misrepresentation and liability for primary market 
misrepresentation and secondary market disclosure pursuant to the 
Securities Act.47  
 
 
41 Christina N. Grant & Richard E. Bélanger, Position Statement: Cannabis and Canada’s 
Children and Youth, CANADIAN PEDIATRIC SOCIETY (May 3, 2017), 
http://www.cps.ca/en/documents/position/cannabis-children-and-youth. 
42 See Will Stone, Some States with Legal Weed Embrace Vaping Bans, Warn of Black-
Market Risks, N.P.R. (Oct. 26, 2019), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2019/10/26/770377080/some-states-with-legal-weed-embrace-vaping-bans-warn-
of-black-market-risks. 
43 Victor Ferreira, OSC Complaint, Class-Action Lawsuits Could Add to CannTrust’s 




45 Barbara Shecter & Vanmala Subramanian, OSC Pursuing CannTrust Investigation as 
‘Quasi-Criminal’ Case, FINANCIAL POST (Aug. 2, 2019), 
http://business.financialpost.com/cannabis/osc-pursuing-canntrust-investigation-as-quasi-
criminal-case. 
46 Ferreira, supra note 40. 
47 CannTrust Holdings Inc. Class Action, STROSBERG SASSO SUTTS LLP (July 10, 2019), 
http://www.strosbergco.com/class-actions/canntrust/; Strosberg Sasso Sutts LLP 
Announces a Class Action Against CannTrust Holdings Inc., FINANCIAL POST (July 11, 
2019), http://business.financialpost.com/pmn/press-releases-pmn/business-wire-news-
releases-pmn/strosberg-sasso-sutts-llp-announces-a-class-action-against-canntrust-
holdings-inc. See also Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, §§ 1, 130 (Can.). 
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When licensed producers and sellers gain access to the cannabis 
industry, good production practices with permitted chemicals and 
pesticides will reduce the risk of costly legal proceedings and reputational 
harm that can occur from product recalls and investigations. Additionally, 
with strict regulations, cannabis businesses, especially large publicly 
traded ones, need to safeguard against unauthorized activities that 
contravene securities law, affect market share, put investors at risk, and 
bring about unwanted legal proceedings.  
d. Licensing 
 
Due to restrictions on the number of detail locations in some 
provinces, illegal dispensaries have become relatively prevalent. In 
Ontario, where there are currently only twenty-five licensed cannabis 
retailers for 14.5 million people, Toronto officials have laid forty-one 
charges related to non-licensed cannabis dispensaries.48 At the time of 
writing, there are thirty-two illegal dispensaries operating in the city, 
despite the potential fines of up to $1 million.49  Part of the incentive is 
that illegal dispensaries can make in excess of $20,000 in sales daily.50 
This profitability results in shuttered illegal dispensaries often re-opening 
in a different location with a different name.  
 
These dispensaries, however, are not without risk for landlords. Those 
who rent commercial space to illegal dispensaries may be liable for 
criminal charges and steep fines. If charged and found guilty, commercial 
landlords renting to illegal cannabis dispensaries can be imprisoned for up 
to two years or be fined up to $250,000.51 Even before the legal process 
determines if these remedies are appropriate, the municipality could issue 
an interim closure order, which deprives the landlord of income, and could 
result in mortgage default or foreclosure.52 Additionally, the Crown can 
seize the property if it can illustrate that it was used for an unlawful 
 
48 City Pushing for Closure of 21 Illegal Cannabis Shops but Still Faces Uphill Battle, CBC 
NEWS (Apr. 17, 2019), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/illegal-cannabis-stores-
toronto-mark-sraga-1.5101325 [hereinafter, Illegal Cannabis Shops]. 
49 Cannabis Control Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 26, Sched. 1, § 6 (Can.). 
50 Illegal Cannabis Shops, supra note 48. 
51 Cannabis Control Act, supra note 49 at §§ 13(1), 23(1). 
52 David S. Reiter & Brian Chung, The Ontario Cannabis Control Act and Implications for 
Commercial Landlord, AIRD & BERLIS LLP (Apr. 24, 2019), 
http://www.airdberlis.com/insights/publications/publication/the-ontario-cannabis-control-
act-and-implications-for-commercial-landlords. 
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activity.53 The Crown can also make an order for the forfeiture of any 
proceeds of unlawful activity, including rental payments received from a 
tenant operating an illegal dispensary.54 This order does not have to 
accompany a conviction; rather, it can be made when charges are laid.55 
Therefore, commercial landlords can be put in unpredictable situations if 
they are leasing commercial space to a dispensary operating without a 
license. Landlords need to know precisely who they are renting their space 
to in order to prevent receipt of a fine or being subject to a forfeiture.  
III. CAPITAL MARKETS ACCEPTANCE 
 
By one measure, the cannabis industry has been successful in seeking 
capital in the financial markets. In fact, the industry has been so successful 
at raising money that it has led to concerns that the market is over-
capitalized. For example, in 2018, Tilray’s shares soared more than 
1,000%, making its market capitalization larger than that of major 
established companies, surpassing American Airlines.56 When cannabis 
was first legalized, the market capitalization of the industry as a whole in 
Canada exceeded that of publicly traded grocery stores, implying that 
consumers would spend more on cannabis than on groceries.57 In the long-
run, it was unlikely that a mature industry with established players selling 
necessities would be surpassed by a novel sector selling recreational 
products. After a strong initial debut, the stock prices of major cannabis 
companies have declined by more than 50%.58 Despite this slide, there are 
very few indications that cannabis companies are not able to receive 
adequate funding from the capital markets.  
 
Another important source of revenue for these new companies is 
access to credit at affordable rates. However, while the legal cannabis 
 
53 Civil Remedies Act, S.O. 2001, c. 28, § 8(1) (Can.).  
54 Reiter & Chung, supra note 49. 
55 Id. 
56 Sarah Halzack, The Cannabis Market is Looking Up, Even if Cannabis Stocks Aren’t, 
BNN BLOOMBERG (Sept. 19, 2019), http://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/the-cannabis-market-is-
looking-up-even-if-cannabis-stocks-aren-t-1.1318673. 
57 Victor Ferreira, Feeling Burned: The First Year of Legal Cannabis has Been a Complete 
Disaster for Investors, FINANCIAL POST (Oct. 9, 2019), 
http://business.financialpost.com/cannabis/cannabis-business/cannabis-investing/feeling-
burned-the-first-year-of-legal-cannabis-has-been-a-complete-disaster-for-investors. 
58 Id.  
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industry is growing exponentially, institutional investment in the cannabis 
industry by Canadian banks is lagging behind.59 Banks have been hesitant 
to invest in cannabis-related businesses out of fear of reputational harm 
and the high-risks associated with new industries.60 The Royal Bank of 
Canada explicitly said that it would not provide banking services to 
companies “engaged in the production and distribution of marijuana.”61 
Additionally, in an effort to manage risk, Scotiabank has made the decision 
to “prohibit the opening of accounts for customers classified as a 
'marijuana-related business.'”62  
 
Since the legalization of recreational cannabis, credit unions, which 
provide financial services to its embers on a cooperative basis, have taken 
the lead in extending credit to the legal cannabis industry.63 For example, 
Alterna Savings & Credit Union Ltd. was the first financial institution to 
lend money to a cannabis company in Ontario.64 The company, Canopy 
Growth, is now the largest publicly traded cannabis producer in the 
world.65 Since that first investment, Alterna has made approximately $750 
million in cannabis-related loans and deposits, which is estimated to be 
distributed amongst sixty licensed cannabis producers in Canada.66 In a 
similar vein, the Windsor Family Credit Union recently lent $25 million 
(USD) to Aphria Inc, a Canadian medical marijuana company.67 Although 
cannabis-related companies are obtaining credit through credit unions, the 
joy may be short-lived, as interest rates for these loans are often well above 
normal averages. Some loans to cannabis-related businesses require 
 
59 Bank Act, S.C. 1991, C. 46, § 2 (Can.); Jonathan Schwarzberg, Banks Pass on Marijuana 
Loans, For Now, REUTERS (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/marijuana-
loans/banks-pass-on-marijuana-loans-for-now-idUSL2N1XD0MN. 
60 Schwarzberg, supra note 56. 
61 Alexandra Posadzki, 2 of Canada’s Top Banks Back Away From Marijuana Industry, 
CBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/banks-marijuana-business-
1.3757927. 
62 Id.  
63 See Credit Unions and Caisses Populaires Act, 1994, S.O. 1994, C. 11, § 24 (Can.); see 
also supra note 59 at § 12.1(1) (discussing the roles or capabilities of federal credit unions); 
Pot Sector Too Risky for Big Banks: Report, ADVISOR’S EDGE (Aug. 29, 2019), 
https://www.advisor.ca/news/industry-news/pot-sector-too-risky-for-big-banks-report/. 
64 Doug Alexander, Meet the Weed Banker Who Took a Chance on Canopy After the Big 




67 Schwarzberg, supra note 59. 
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interest rates of up to 15%.68 The average prime interest rate charged by 
the Bank of Canada and other financial institutions is currently 3.95%.69 
Even major players, such as Aphria and Canopy, are paying higher interest 
rates than they would receive through banks, at between 4.68% and 10%, 
depending on the loan.70 With relatively high interest rates accompanying 
loans granted by credit unions, it is important to determine whether 
cannabis-related businesses, especially those that are beginning 
operations, will have the capacity to generate enough revenue to manage 
the loans that they have acquired.  
 
It is important to note that, while there was initial hesitation from 
Canadian banks, some banks are warming up to the idea of providing loans 
to cannabis-related businesses. In 2018, the Bank of Montreal (BMO) led 
a $175 million financing through the sale of shares for Canopy Growth, 
and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) was a part of a $20 
million credit deal with MedReleaf Corp.71 In 2019, BMO and CIBC, 
along with Concentra Bank, provided up to $80 million in secured 
financing to PharmHouse Inc., a medical marijuana company.72 BMO and 
CIBC collaborated once again to provide a $65 million secured term loan 
to Cronos Group, and a $65 million secured term loan to HEXO.73 RBC, 
although initially against providing services to cannabis-related 
businesses, participated in its first share sale involving CannTrust, valued 
at $200 million.74 If banks continue to provide loans to cannabis-related 
businesses, at average interest rates, their capacity to remain in business 
will increase, reducing the likelihood of loan default and bankruptcy. 
Further, providing credit and financial services to a wide spectrum of 
 
68 Id. 
69 Prime Rate Canada, RATEHUB, http://www.ratehub.ca/prime-rate (last visited July 5, 
2019). 
70 Jonathan Schwarzberg, Banks Pass on Marijuana Loans, For Now, REUTERS (Nov. 2, 
2018, 10:40 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/marijuana-loans/banks-pass-on-
marijuana-loans-for-now-idUSL2N1XD0MN. 
71 Randi Druzin, Keeping a Close Eye on Protocol, Canadian Banks Warm Up to Cannabis, 
LEAFLY (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.leafly.ca/news/canada/profits-are-persuasive-
canadian-banks-warm-up-to-cannabis. 
72 Cannabis Industry Continues to Roll, DAVIES WARD PHILLIPS & VINEBERG BULLETIN 
(June 7, 2019), http://www.dwpv.com/en/Insights#/article/Publications/2019/Cannabis-
Industry-Continues-to-Roll. 
73 Id. 
74 Geoff Zochodne, RBC Set For First Cannabis Equity Financing With CannTrust Share 
Sale, FINANCIAL POST (Apr. 23, 2019), http://business.financialpost.com/news/fp-
street/rbc-set-for-first-cannabis-equity-financing-with-canntrust-share-sale. 
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cannabis businesses, both large and small, will ensure diversity in the 
Canadian legal cannabis market, and contribute positively to its growth.    
IV. INSOLVENCY PROCESSES AND CHALLENGES 
a. Overview  
 
Despite the novelty of the industry, some cannabis companies have 
already filed for creditor protection, or bankruptcy and insolvency 
protection. The first reorganization was for Peloton Pharmaceuticals Inc., 
which conducted research to develop, produce, and distribute 
pharmaceutical-grade cannabis. While waiting for their Health Canada 
permit, the company hired staff and prepared the working area in the 
cultivation facility.75 These expenses of maintaining these operations 
became too onerous to cover without income, leading the company to file 
a proposal for reorganization in 2016.76 Public documents reveal that it 
had 53 unsecured creditors and one preferred creditor with liabilities 
totaling $5,329,460.45. With a total of $788,205.44 in assets, Peloton had 
a deficit of $4,541,255.01.77 Pursuant to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
Act (BIA), the interim receiver was given the power to possess Peloton’s 
property, solicit buyers and investors of the company’s assets, and share 
capital. Peloton’s proposal for reorganization was approved by the Court, 
and the company was ultimately acquired by Aurora Cannabis for $7 
million.78 
 
A second example of a Canadian cannabis company involved in 
insolvency proceedings comes from British Columbia. Ascent Industries 
Corp., under its subsidiary Agrima Botanicals Corp., filed for creditor 
protection under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA)79 
 




77 Id. at ¶ 4. 
78 Proposal, In re Peloton Pharmaceuticals Inc. at ¶. 174., 2017 QQCS 1165 (Can. Que. 
S.C.). See also Jacob Serebrin, Aurora Cannabis Gets Go-Ahead to Grow Pot in Point-
Claire, MONTREAL GAZETTE (May 29, 2018), http://montrealgazette.com/business/aurora-
cannabis-gets-go-ahead-to-grow-pot-in-pointe-claire>. 
79 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (Can.). 
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after Health Canada suspended its license.80 The license was suspended in 
September 2018 for failure to meet compliance requirements. Of particular 
interest in this case is that Ascent has subsidiary companies in the U.S., 
but only one, which holds real property in Nevada, was a party to the 
proceedings.81 That being said, the property located in Nevada is not 
included in the listed assets for sale.82 A subsidiary of one of Ascent’s 
secured creditors bought all of Ascent’s rights, titles and interests to 
specific assigned contracts, intellectual property assets, personal property, 
and real property for $29 million.83   
b. Provincial Legislation  
 
While these examples illustrate the availability of both of Canada’s 
main bankruptcy and restructuring regimes (the BIA and the CCAA) to 
cannabis companies, regulatory challenges in applying them remain. With 
the federal legalization of recreational cannabis in Canada, provinces and 
territories were able to develop their own legislation and regulations for 
the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of cannabis. As a result, 
there are 13 different systems managing cannabis and cannabis licenses 
throughout Canada. Some provincial/territorial cannabis statutes 
specifically outline what responsibilities licensees, trustees, and receivers 
have during insolvency proceedings, some grant interim or temporary 
licenses to trustees or creditors in possession, while others still are silent. 
As a result, cannabis companies need to be cognizant of how their 
respective province or territory treats insolvent cannabis companies.  
 
In British Columbia, the Cannabis Control and Licensing Act84 
includes a section that clearly explains who has specific rights and 
responsibilities when a licensee goes bankrupt. Section 29(2) states: 
 
If an interim receiver, receiver, custodian, trustee, 
receiver manager or liquidator has been appointed under 
the Business Corporations Act, the Law and Equity Act, 
 
80 Filing for Creditor Protection at ¶ 5., 2019 BCSC 1880, No. S-192188 (Can. B.C.S.C.). 
See also id. at s 3(1). 
81 In re Ascent Industries Corp. et al. (Mar. 1, 2019) British Columbia S-192188 (Can. 
B.C.S.C.) at ¶ 5. See also id at s 3(1).  
82 Id. at ¶ 9. 
83 Id. at ¶¶ 50-53.  
84 Id. at ¶¶ 14–15, 18, 22.  
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the Personal Property Security Act, the Supreme Court 
Act, the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Canada) or 
the Winding-up and Restructuring Act (Canada) for a 
licensee, the person appointed has the powers and 
obligations of the licensee. 
 
Although this is a simple statement, it removes any confusion that a 
court appointed trustee or receiver might have when working on behalf of 
a cannabis company.  
 
In Newfoundland, the Cannabis Control Act85 allows for a temporary 
cannabis license to be issued to a creditor in possession, or a trustee in 
bankruptcy, for one year in order to dispose of the cannabis store or the 
cannabis retail location.86 Similarly, Yukon’s Cannabis Control and 
Regulation Act87 allows the Cannabis Licensing Board to issue a six month 
interim license to an assignee, receiver, or trustee in bankruptcy if the 
original licensee loses control of their business or premises.88 While 
holding the interim license, the assignee, receiver, or trustee assumes all 
privileges and liabilities of a licensee.89 Alberta’s Gaming, Liquor and 
Cannabis Regulation90 also allows a temporary license for three months to 
be issued to a person to carry on activities permitted by the original 
licensee if they dispose of the business.91  
 
Saskatchewan’s regime currently provides the most direction to 
trustees and receivers for cannabis businesses. The Cannabis Authority has 
the power to transfer a cannabis license if a trustee in bankruptcy or a 
court-appointed receiver.92 If a cannabis license is cancelled and cannabis 
is forfeited to the Cannabis Authority, the Cannabis Authority can request 
the Court of Queen’s Bench to appoint a trustee, receiver, custodian, 
receiver manager, or liquidator to manage the forfeited cannabis.93 Further, 
when a trustee, receiver, custodian, receiver manager, or liquidator is 
 
85 Cannabis Control and Licensing Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 19 (Can.).  
86 Id. at § 40. 
87 Cannabis Control Regulation Act, S.Y., c.4 (Can.). 
88 Id. at § 38(1). 
89 Id. at § 38(5). 
90 Gaming, Liquor and Cannabis Regulation, Alta. Reg. 143/1996 (Can.). 
91 Id. at § 115.  
92 The Cannabis Control (Saskatchewan) Regulations, R.R.S. c C-2.111 Reg 1, § 3-14(1)(g) 
(Can.).  
93 Id. at § 3–15(5). 
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appointed, they have the power to, “sell, dispose of or otherwise deal with 
the cannabis, and distribute any proceeds from the cannabis in a manner 
directed by the court.”94 
 
Clarity about the transferability of the cannabis license, and the duties 
of the trustee, receiver, or assigner are vital for insolvency practitioners 
navigating this new industry. However, at the time of writing, only five of 
the 13 provinces and territories have legislation or regulations that address 
insolvency processes and the status of the cannabis license during 
insolvency. To help ensure the orderly restructuring or unwinding of 
cannabis businesses, the remaining provinces and territories should add 
guidance about insolvency to their cannabis statutes.   
c. Cannabis on Reserves 
 
The Cannabis Act currently has no framework for the sale of cannabis 
on First Nation Reserves, despite sustained concerns regarding the lack of 
engagement with First Nation communities during the legislative 
process.95 Given the lack of consultation with First Nations communities 
and the increasing recognition of Indigenous sovereignty, the Senate 
Committee on Aboriginal Peoples recommended that the bill’s 
implementation be delayed by a year.96 This suggestion was not adopted.97 
Instead, the government has started consultations with First Nations 
groups with an aim of amending the Cannabis Act to better reflect 
Indigenous concerns. However, the regulation of cannabis on reserve is 
tied up in larger questions about Indigenous sovereignty. Some 
communities want a continued ban on cannabis on their lands – a decision 
 
94 Id. at § 3–15(7). 
95 Jesse Donovan, Canada and the Provinces Should Respect Indigenous Communities’ 
Right to Either Develop Cannabis-Related Opportunities or to Prohibit Cannabis, IRPP 
(Aug. 1, 2019), https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/august-2019/canada-must-
respect-indigenous-cannabis-laws/; Konstantia Koutouki & Katherine Lofts, Cannabis, 
Reconciliation, and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Prospects and Challenges for 
Cannabis Legalization in Canada, 56:3 ALTA. L. REV. 709, 710 (2019) (“Th[e] omission 
[of Indigenous communities] has sparked outcry on the part of Indigenous peoples across 
Canada, who have also expressed concern over the lack of adequate consultation by the 
government, the application of provincial regulations on reserves and traditional territories, 
and the exclusion of First Nations from the law’s excise tax revenue sharing framework, 
among other issues.”). 
96 Donovan, supra note 88; Koutouki & Lofts, supra note 88 at 723-74. 
97 Koutouki & Lofts, supra note 95 at 723–724, 727.  
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which the federal government has pledged to support.98 The regulatory 
framework becomes even more complicated for First Nations who want to 
take advantage of the opportunities presented by cannabis or have been 
operating dispensaries for decades. Numerous communities have taken the 
position that the federal and provincial regulations do not apply to their 
lands.99 Others have passed their own laws that meet or exceed the 
requirements off-reserve.100 These laws have led to questions about how 
these communities would enforce their regulations, and about their 
validity where they conflict with federal legislation.101  
 
Another point of contention with the status quo on cannabis is that 
First Nations communities currently have no mechanism to collect 
revenues from cannabis sales. Currently, the federal and provincial 
governments split the excise taxes received from cannabis.102 Even if 
cannabis is sold on reserve, there is no formal way that the band council 
or other governmental body can directly benefit from it. Before the writs 
were drawn up for the 2019 federal election, the government had been 
working with First Nations groups to develop a workable revenue-sharing 
and jurisdictional arrangement.103 The Commissioner of the First Nations 
Tax Commission has proposed that First Nations should be able to keep 
75-100% of the excise or commodity taxes generated from cannabis sales 
on reserve.104 These controversial topics are unlikely to be resolved in the 
near future.105  
 
 
98 Jorge Barrera, Ottawa Won’t Fight First Nations that Choose to Ban Cannabis: Blair, 
CBC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2018), http://www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/fn-senate-pot-1.4849876. 
99 Jorge Barrera, Next Federal Government Needs to Amend Cannabis Act, Say First 
Nations Chiefs, CBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2019, http://www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/cannabis-
first-nations-laws-1.5299972>. (hereinafter, First Nations Chiefs); Donovan, supra note 
88. 
100 Colin Graf, How First Nations Are Dealing with Thriving, but Illegal, Cannabis Stores, 
VICE (Dec. 20, 2018, 10:34am), http://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/kzv54m/how-first-
nations-are-dealing-with-thriving-but-illegal-cannabis-stores. 
101 First Nations Chiefs, supra note 99.  
102 Jorge Barrera, Ottawa in Talks to Work Out Cannabis Rules for First Nations 
Territories, CBC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2019, 4:00 AM), 
www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/cannabis-first-nations-framework-1.5258544. 
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
105 The new Cabinet was named on November 20, 2019. It is unlikely that the legislative 
calendar will allow for amendments to the Cannabis Act to become law until late 2020 at 
the earliest.  
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Provincial governments are also struggling with how best to address 
the question of dispensaries on-reserve. Some provinces have encouraged 
these businesses to apply for a license, while others have set up a lottery 
specifically for them.106 At the time of writing, there are many dispensaries 
on reserve which are operating without a license. In Ontario, the provincial 
police estimate that there are 79 unlicensed cannabis distributors operating 
on 23 First Nations.107 As with federal government regulations, it remains 
to be seen if provincial regulations will be enforced on reserve. Some 
illegal dispensaries have been raided, although there does not appear to be 
widespread enforcement.108 
 
In an insolvency situation, First Nations cannabis businesses could 
face additional complexities than those off-reserve. Creditors will have 
different recourse to satisfy unpaid debts depending on the corporate 
structure of the business. If it was incorporated by a band or Indigenous 
person, the distinct legal character of the corporation would allow the 
creditor to proceed as they would off-reserve.109 However, if a cannabis 
dispensary was set-up as a sole proprietorship, partnership, or by the band 
itself, most secured creditors would have no recourse for default.110 This 
is because the Indian Act prevents banks or other lenders from attaching 
their loan to property situated on reserve unless they are a band or another 
“Indian” as defined by the Act.111  
V. AREAS FOR REFORM & POINTS OF CLARIFICATION 
 
This section draws on the Canadian experience to suggest best 
practices that should be followed to ensure that cannabis companies are 
not treated differently than any other legitimate business regarding 
bankruptcy relief.  
 
106 Braela Kwan, ‘We’re Pretty Proud of It’: BC’s First Indigenous-Owned Legal Pot Shop 
Opens, THE TYEE (June 25, 2019), http://thetyee.ca/News/2019/06/25/First-Indigenous-
Owned-Legal-Cannabis-Store-BC/; Emma Spears, Ontario First Nations Balk at 
Province’s Newly Announced Cannabis Retail Licence Lottery, THE GROWTH OP (July 11, 
2019), http://www.thegrowthop.com/cannabis-culture/ontario-first-nations-balk-at-
provinces-newly-announced-cannabis-retail-licence-lottery. 
107 First Nations Chiefs, supra note 99. 
108 Id.  
109 Kinookimaw Beach Association v Saskatchewan (1979), 102 D.L.R. 3d 333 (Can. Sask. 
C.A.). 
110 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, § 89(1) (Can.).  
111 Id at § 89(1).  
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Countries looking to legalize recreational cannabis should do so at the 
federal level before the regional, provincial, or state level governments 
have the ability to do so. This will ensure that the entire country will have 
uniform standards enforced, despite the slightly different regulatory 
schemes at the local level. If recreational cannabis legalization occurs at 
the federal level first, all other federal laws and regulations should be 
updated to ensure that there are no operability issues.  
 
A second consideration that needs to be addressed is the appropriate 
level of supply. If there are no limits on the number of licenses that can be 
issued, there may be more supply than demand, which can result in 
companies going bankrupt. Some jurisdictions are restricting the number 
of licenses available due to concerns of oversupply. However, avoiding 
bankruptcy cannot be the only concern for governments regulating the 
cannabis industry. Too much intervention in the name of preventing 
oversaturation can lead to diminished supply and inefficiencies. Before 
legalization, some scholars argued that placing a cap on cannabis retail 
licenses would only benefit the black market, as supply and wait times for 
cannabis would be an issue.112 Their warning has been proven correct by 
Ontario’s experience with legalization. On the day that all licensed 
storefronts were expected to begin operations, only nine of the twenty-five 
officially opened their doors to the public.113 Not only does an inadequate 
supply encourage cannabis consumers to seek the product on the black 
market, depriving governments of potential tax revenue, it undercuts the 
regulations aimed to protect consumers. If a surplus of businesses can 
satisfy Health Canada’s requirements, the market will self-adjust to 
resolve concerns about market oversaturation.  
 
Further, even though the initial number of licensed retailers was low, 
supplier of Canadian cannabis are now expected to rapidly increase.114 
One analyst predicts that Canada will experience an oversupply of 
 
112 Leah Hansen, Cannabis Entrepreneurs in 'Tough Spot' After Ontario Caps Licenses, 
CBC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2018, 4:00 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/cannabis-
entrepreneur-slams-provincial-cap-on-pot-stores-1.4947929.  
113 Nick Boisvert, Pot Stores are Now Legal in Ontario – Get Ready for Lineups, Shortages 
and Delayed Openings, CBC NEWS (Apr. 2, 201), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ontario-cannabis-opening-day-1.5076935.  
114 Peter Armstrong, Canada’s Chronic Shortage of Legal Cannabis Expected to Drag Out 
For Years, CBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2019), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/canada-cannabis-
shortage-years-1.4988195. See also Department of Justice, Cannabis Legalization and 
Regulation (Oct. 17, 2018), http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/cannabis/. 
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cannabis in its dried form by January 2020.115 This oversupply is 
anticipated to lead to a new problem – getting it to market. The analyst 
predicted that there would be enough dried cannabis to supply 617 retail 
stores, yet there will  only be 400 operational cannabis stores by the end 
of 2019.116 Additionally, with cannabis-infused edibles, extracts, and 
topicals recently becoming legal, some cannabis consumers may turn to 
the edible market and from dried cannabis – making the issue of 
oversupply even more challenging and hard to predict in the short-term.117   
 
A third area of potential reform is the restrictions on license ownership 
or concentration. While some provinces and territories do not limit the 
number of licenses that can be issued, there are instances where a single 
entity or person is capped to a specific number of cannabis retail licenses 
in a given province or territory. For example, Alberta Gaming, Liquor and 
Cannabis does not place a limit on the number of retail cannabis licenses 
that can be issued. However, no person or entity can hold more than 15% 
of the total retail cannabis licenses in the province.118 Therefore, if 200 
retail licenses were issued, a single person or entity could only possess 30 
of them. Until December 31, 2020, an individual or entity can only hold a 
maximum of 42 licenses.119  
 
Similarly, British Columbia, which also does not cap the number of 
retail licenses that can be issued, only allows a single entity to hold a 
maximum of eight licenses.120 Saskatchewan, which initially issued 51 
cannabis retail licenses, does not limit on the number of licenses that a 
person or entity can possess. In fact, Saskatchewan’s cannabis regulations 
allow a license holder to sell their interest in their cannabis retail store 
license.121 As a result, larger cannabis companies have bought out many 
 
115 Vanmala Subramaniam, What Cannabis Shortage? Analyst Warns Oversupply Could 




117 Industrial Hemp Regulations, SOR/2018-145 (Can.). See also Regulatory Impact 
Statement SOR/2018, (2018) C. Gaz. I, Regulations Amending the Cannabis Regulations 
(New Classes of Cannabis), Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, SOR/2018 (Dec. 22, 
2018), Canada Gazette, Part I, vol 152, no 51 (Can.),  
118 ALBERTA GAMING, LIQUOR, AND CANNABIS, COMMONLY ASKED QUESTIONS (Nov. 6, 
2019), http://aglc.ca/cannabis/commonly-asked-questions. 
119 Id. 
120 Cannabis Licensing Regulation, B.C. Reg. 202/2018, § 6(3) (Can.).  
121 The Cannabis Control (Saskatchewan) Regulations, R.R.S. c. C-2.111, Reg. 1, § 3–4. 
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smaller cannabis businesses. Of the 51 licensed cannabis retail stores in 
Saskatchewan, only 34 are currently in operation. When the licenses were 
first issued, Canopy Growth, operating under its subsidiary Tweed, 
Westleaf, and Fire & Flower Holdings Corp., only owned seven.122 These 
companies now hold 17 of the 34 operating licenses, or 50% of the retail 
cannabis market in the province.123  
 
Monopolization can be problematic because consumers are limited in 
their product selection, and smaller independent retailers are often shut out 
of the market. These pressures can limit innovation and entrepreneurship. 
As a result, provinces and territories that do not limit the number of 
licenses a single entity or person can hold should consider whether or not 
it will provide their economy with sufficient diversity of choice.  
VI. CANADIAN BANKRUPTCY FOR AMERICAN CANNABIS 
COMPANIES  
 
Similar to Canada, the federal level of government has jurisdiction 
over bankruptcy in the United States. This constitutional distinction is 
relevant since cannabis remains illegal federally, despite its legalization in 
a number of states.124 As a result, bankruptcy trustees have refused to 
liquidate the assets of marijuana companies, and sought to dismiss the 
restructuring plans of a cannabis company that proposed to pay creditors 
with funds from marijuana sales.125 This prohibition applies even for 
corporations that supply cannabis-related companies. For example, in In 
re Way to Grow Inc., et al,126 the debtor’s reorganization plan was rejected 
by the Court because it depended on sales of “equipment, chemical, 
product or material which may be used to manufacture a controlled 
 
122 For original list of cannabis retailers, see D.C. Fraser, Pot Shops Picked: Province 
Defends Permit Process for Saskatchewan’s Marijuana Dispensaries, REGINA LEADER-
POST (June 1, 2018), http://leaderpost.com/news/saskatchewan/pot-shops-picked-here-are-
the-people-who-will-be-running-saskatchewans-marijuana-dispensaries.  
123 Cannabis Retailers in Saskatchewan, SASKATCHEWAN LIQUOR AND GAMING 
AUTHORITY (July 19, 2019), http://www.slga.com/permits-and-licences/cannabis-
permits/cannabis-retailing/cannabis-retailers-in-saskatchewan. Retail cannabis stores 
owned by Westleaf operate under the banner “Prairie Records.” 
124 Gregory Garvin, Federal Law Generally Precludes Bankruptcy Relief for Debtors with 
Marijuana Property Interests, 66 U. S. Attorneys’ Bulletin, 197 (2018). 
125 Id.  
126 In re Way to Grow, Inc., et al, 597 B.R. 111, 132–33 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2018). 
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substance.”127 Some states have attempted to bridge this gap by amending 
their receivership laws to benefit marijuana-based companies, but the 
broad relief of bankruptcy remains unavailable.128  
 
The inability of American cannabis companies to access bankruptcy 
relief through federal bankruptcy courts creates a significant opportunity 
for Canada. American cannabis companies that are publicly traded in 
Canada may be able to take advantage of our insolvency regime for 
cannabis companies.129 If a parent company is located in Canada, it is 
possible that subsidiaries located in the U.S. will enjoy the benefits of 
federal legalization of recreational cannabis in Canada. This may 
encourage American cannabis companies to set up their operations 
strategically to give them a safety net if things go wrong.  
 
American cannabis companies with a presence in Canada may also be 
able to utilize Chapter 15 bankruptcy proceedings to restructure a business 
or liquidate assets that would otherwise be illegal in the U.S. Chapter 15 
bankruptcy proceedings provide mechanisms for dealing with cross-
border insolvency cases to protect the interests of creditors and the debtor 
involved in the proceeding.130 Additionally, unlike other types of 
bankruptcy proceedings in the American system, Chapter 15 proceedings 
do not create an estate of the debtor’s property.131 Therefore, the American 
trustee does not need to possess or administer cannabis related assets or 
financial proceeds.132 However, if a Chapter 15 debtor is seeking 
recognition of a Canadian court’s insolvency proceedings, the trustee may 
argue that the recognition should not be allowed as it is against public 
policy of the United States given the federal ban on cannabis.133 To help 
guide the application of the public policy exception provided for in section 
1506 of the Bankruptcy Code, three principles have been identified:  
 
127 Id at 127.  
128 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55-137 (2018); see also OR. ADMIN. R. 845-025-1260 
(2016).  
129 Cheryl V. Reicin et al., Canada/US Cross-Border Cannabis Issues, WEED DIARIES 
(Nov. 24, 2017), https://weeddiaries.com/canadaus-cross-border-cannabis-issues/. 
130 11 U.S.C. §1501 (2012); see also Jason Rosell, Will US Cannabis Companies Find 
Grass is Greener in Canada for Restructuring?, TURNAROUND MGMT. ASSOC. (Jan./Feb. 
2019), http://turnaround.org/jcr/2019/01/will-us-cannabis-companies-find-grass-greener-
canada-restructuring.  
131 Rosell, supra note 123. 
132 See generally Bankruptcy Code, supra note 123, at §§ 541(a), 704, 1106 (other than 
Chapter 15 methods of bankruptcy in the United States); Rosell, supra note 123. 
133 See Bankruptcy Code, supra note 123, at § 1506. 
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(1) The mere fact of conflict between foreign law and U.S. 
law, absent other considerations, is insufficient to support 
the invocation of the public policy exception.  
(2) Deference to a foreign proceeding should not be 
afforded in a Chapter 15 proceeding where the procedural 
fairness of the foreign proceeding is in doubt or cannot be 
cured by the adoption of additional protections.   
(3) An action should not be taken in a Chapter 15 
proceeding where taking such action would frustrate a 
U.S. court's ability to administer the Chapter 15 
proceeding and/or would impinge severely a U.S. 
constitutional or statutory right, particularly if a party 
continues to enjoy the benefits of the Chapter 15 
proceeding.134  
 
In short, Chapter 15 can allow for circumstances where American 
companies reorganized in other countries could benefit from options they 
would not be able to if the proceedings had happened in the United States. 
One example of this is with non-debtor third-party involuntary releases. 
This mechanism to exculpate non-debtor officers and directors from 
liability is not widely available in domestic restructurings in the U.S..135 In 
contrast, a non-debtor release was enforced by the Bankruptcy Court after 
being ordered by a court in Ontario.136 This experience illustrates that 
Chapter 15 could be used to the benefit of insolvent cannabis companies, 
even while the federal prohibition remains in place domestically.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Developing the regulatory framework for a new industry is always 
challenging for policymakers. This is especially so for the legalized 
 
134 Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co. (In re Qimonda AG), 470 B.R. 374, 380-81 (E.D. Va. 2012). 
135See e.g. In re Aegean Marine Petroleum Network, Inc., 599 B.R. 717 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2019). 
136 In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments, et al., 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alt. Invs., 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
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cannabis industry, which, unlike other new industries, had millions of 
interested consumers on the first day it became legal. The controversy over 
legalization also ensured that the industry would be tightly regulated by 
governments. While some of these choices speak to the safety of the 
product, many have had a dramatic effect on framing the business risk in 
the sector. The Canadian experience is already beginning to illustrate the 
effects of these policy choices on the business risks faced by cannabis 
entrepreneurs. These challenges include the ever-changing and sometimes 
overlapping regulatory landscape, over/under supply, and market 
concentration.  
These policy choices can have consequences for any industry. 
However, they are felt particularly acutely by this nascent sector that has 
often struggled to meet the demand of millions of Canadians. Coupled 
with the expectations of a “green gold rush,” it is inevitable that some of 
these new companies will fail. Clear procedures and responsibilities, as in 
Saskatchewan’s laws, would be a good exemplar for other provinces to 
consider. The lack of insolvency proceedings south of the border also 
makes it more likely that our courts will need to contend with a higher 
number of cannabis bankruptcies – presenting both a unique opportunity 
and major challenges. Policymakers should begin preparing for this 
eventuality while this young sector is still growing to ensure that all parties 
involved understand what happens when things go wrong.  
 
 
